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INTRODUCTION
Jorge Solomon-Membreno and Fatima Marlene VillanuevaMembreno are siblings who grew up in their grandmother’s house in
Sensuntepeque, El Salvador.1 Sensuntepeque suffers from prolific
gang violence at the hands of MS-13, a transnational gang that
commits ongoing acts of assault, rape, and torture.2 MS-13 is present
in every part of El Salvador, and exercises control over innocent
civilians with horrific acts of violence.3 During his adolescence, Jorge
was approached by members of MS-13 in an attempt to recruit him,
but Jorge refused.4 His sister Fatima, who was eleven years old at the
time, endured a barrage of sexual harassment from MS-13 members,
who at one point threatened to “get her.”5 On her way home from
school, Fatima was seized and knocked unconscious.6 When she
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Solomon-Membreno v. Holder, 578 F. App’x 300, 302 (4th Cir. 2014).

Id.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 302.
Id.
Id.
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regained consciousness, her chest was exposed, her clothes were
ripped, and she felt an immense pain in her stomach.7 Jorge
confronted the gang members he believed to be responsible for
Fatima’s rape; they responded by beating Jorge until he ran to safety.8
Jorge did not seek help because he thought the police would provide
no assistance, as is common in El Salvador.9 Jorge and Fatima sought
refuge from the gang at their aunt’s home in a nearby town.10 After
some time, they returned to their grandmother’s home, but confined
themselves inside to avoid encountering the gang again.11
Jorge fled El Salvador and entered the United States near Tecate,
California.12 There, the Department of Homeland Security served him
with a Notice to Appear in removal proceedings.13 Fatima stayed at
her grandmother’s house, but shortly followed in her brother’s
footsteps after discovering her grandmother’s home had been set on
fire.14 Fatima entered the United States near Hidalgo, Texas, and was
also served with a Notice to Appear in removal proceedings.15 Jorge
and Fatima applied for asylum to avoid being deported back to El
Salvador, where they were sure MS-13 awaited their arrival.16 After
lengthy legal proceedings and a denial of their application, Jorge and
Fatima appealed their case to the Fourth Circuit.17 The Fourth
Circuit affirmed the denial of their asylum application, concluding
that Jorge and Fatima did not constitute “refugees” under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because they did not satisfy
the Act’s definition of “a refugee.”18
Section 1158(b)(1)(A) of the INA, which is the statute governing
asylum claims, requires that an applicant establish that he or she is a
refugee in order to obtain asylum in the United States.19 In order to
establish refugee status, an applicant must show that he or she is
persecuted because of his or her race, national origin, political
opinion, or membership in a particular social group with defined

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 303.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 303–04.
See id. at 306.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012).
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boundaries.20 Fatima and Jorge sought to establish refugee status by
asserting that they were being persecuted by gang members on
account of their membership in a particular social group.21 The
Fourth Circuit denied their application because their proposed group
lacked boundaries.22 Without asylum, Fatima and Jorge would have
to return to the very nightmare they sought to escape.
Jorge’s and Fatima’s experience with gangs in El Salvador and in
the United States court system is not unique.23 Their story is a prime
example of the very issue circuit courts are confronted with by the
recent influx of immigrants from Honduras, El Salvador, and
Guatemala.24 Many Circuits have attempted to resolve the issue of
whether the “membership in a particular social group” category of
“refugee” includes children who flee gang violence in inner cities.25
Courts of Appeals have reached different conclusions about whether
the provision covers situations like those faced by Jorge and Fatima.26
This division has led to a lack of uniformity in the application of
Section 1158(b)(1)(A), and individuals with almost identical cases can
receive contradictory judgments.27
Part I of this Note discusses the history of gang violence and
government corruption in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala.
Additionally, Part I explains the basic asylum process under Section
1158(b)(1)(A), which every individual must navigate to be granted
asylum. Part II of this Note examines the requirements the Board of
20. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
21. Jorge claimed that he belonged to a “social group of young Salvadoran
students who expressly oppose gang practices and values and wish to protect their
family against such practices.” Solomon-Membreno, 578 F. App’x at 301. Fatima
argued that she belonged to a “social group composed of young female students who
are related to an individual who opposes gang practices and values.” Id.
22. Id. at 306.
23. See generally Benjamin Mueller, To Help Unaccompanied Minors, New York
City Posts Representatives at Immigration Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/17/nyregion/to-help-unaccompanied-minors-cityposts-representatives-at-immigration-court.html.
24. See Haeyoun Park, Children at the Border, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/15/us/questions-about-the-borderkids.html.
25. See discussion infra Part II.B.
26. See discussion infra Part II.B.
27. Mejia-Fuentes v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 463 F. App’x 76, 80–81 (3d Cir. 2012)
(granting the asylum-seeker’s petition for review and remanding to the BIA); RiveraBarrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 650 (10th Cir. 2012) (finding the asylum-seeker’s
claim met two of the three requirements, but ultimately affirming the BIA’s
decision); Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2010) (denying the
petition for review because the asylum-seeker’s claim only met one of the three
requirements).
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Immigration Appeals (BIA) has promulgated for defining a particular
social group and the differing tests that circuit courts have used to
determine if an individual meets those requirements. The BIA
scrutinizes every purported particular social group with a three-part
test,28 but circuit courts have not unanimously accepted this test.29 In
addition, Part II explores the BIA and circuit court jurisprudence
with respect to proposed particular social groups in the context of
Central American gangs. Although most circuits have denied asylum
to children fleeing gang violence in Central American cities, there are
two circuits that have yet to take on the issue, and another circuit that
stands with only one foot in the door of acceptance.30
Part III of this Note adopts the BIA’s three-part test to analyze
asylum applications of individuals seeking to establish a particular
social group. Since the BIA has the authority to oversee the
adjudication of asylum applications and the BIA has properly
explained its reasoning for the three-part test, its standard deserves
deference. However, this Note disagrees with the BIA with respect to
whether children fleeing gang violence are entitled to asylum, by
concluding that individuals between the ages of eleven and eighteen,
who escape gang-forced recruitment, are deserving of asylum.31
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND
IN THE U.S. A SYLUM P ROCESS
A. The Government Corruption and Plague of Gang Violence in
the Inner Cities of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala
Horrific violence committed by growing gangs, such as MS-13,
plagues El Salvador.32 Gangs, whose membership numbers are more
than 85,000, participate in kidnapping, extortion, and forced

28. See infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1; see also In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 392
(B.I.A. 2014).
29. See discussion infra Part II.A.4.
30. See discussion infra Part II.B.
31. This Note will put special emphasis on male children who suffer from forced
recruitment. Because of the unique issues raised with females who are subjected to
sexual violence, the topic of female children fleeing sexual-related forced recruitment
is outside of the scope of this Note. However, this Note will attempt to analogize
females and males for the general purpose of forced recruitment, but the issue of
sexual violence in asylum law will be avoided.
32. This Note discusses the effect gangs have on El Salvador, Honduras, and
Guatemala, but will reference MS-13 in particular because it is the good example of
gang activity in those countries.
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recruitment.33 These groups in general, and MS-13 in particular, rely
on forced recruitment to expand their memberships.34 Male children
often attempt to leave El Salvador because of a fear of assault or
death for refusing to join gangs.35 Additionally, gangs threaten to kill
the families of the young boys they try to recruit,36 and female
children fear rape or kidnappings at the hands of gang members.37
El Salvador’s citizens are at the whim of these gang activities
because the judicial system and executive branch do not provide
much assistance.38 Unfortunately, this has led El Salvador to be
ranked first in the world for femicide (female homicide) and lethal

33. WILLIAM A. KANDEL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43628,
UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN: POTENTIAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO
RECENT IMMIGRATION 8 (2014), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/
R43628.pdf.
34. DIV. OF INT’L PROT., UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES
(UNHCR), GUIDANCE NOTE ON REFUGEE CLAIMS RELATING TO VICTIMS OF
ORGANIZED
GANGS
2
(2010)
[hereinafter
UNHCR],
available
at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4bb21fa02.html.
35. WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM., CENTRAL AMERICAN GANG-RELATED
ASYLUM: A RESOURCE GUIDE 3 (2008), available at http://www.wola.org/sites/
default/files/downloadable/Central%20America/past/CA%20GangRelated%20Asylum.pdf.
36. See, e.g., Michael Vincent, Gang Violence in Central America Drives Victims
to Make Risky Cross-Border Journey to New Life in US, ABC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2014),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-10-24/gang-violence-central-americans-cross-usaborder/5815552. In an interview, a concerned mother explains that she and her
family fled their country because boys are threatened with death or harm to their
families if they refuse to join. See id.
37. WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM., supra note 35, at 3. Rape victims do not report
the crime because of a fear of reprisal, ineffective and unsupportive responses from
authorities, and the public perception of the unlikely chance of conviction. BUREAU
OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, EL SALVADOR
2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 15 (2014), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/220654.pdf. The fact that in 2013 there were 4826 sexual assault claims,
but only 392 convictions supports the public’s perception of the unlikelihood of
sexual assault convictions. Id. at 15 (noting that rape laws are, in fact, ineffectively
enforced).
38. Substantial corruption in the judicial system, which undermines the rule of law
and deteriorates the public’s respect for the judiciary, led to a criminal conviction rate
of less than five percent. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 37, at 7 (citing the role that gangs play in the promotion
of impunity through their use of intimidation). Furthermore, the uncontested threats
to, and killings of, police officers, witnesses, and victims, has led to a large
impediment of criminal investigations. Id. After explaining the beating he received
for refusing to join a gang, an unnamed immigrant child recognizes the dire situation
in an interview by stating, “[t]he gangs have practically taken control of my country.
You don’t feel free there, it’s too dangerous.” Mila Koumpilova, Unaccompanied
Children’s Cases Put Immigration System to the Test, STAR TRIBUNE, Oct. 16, 2014,
http://www.startribune.com/local/279515212.html.
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violence in 2011.39 The Salvadoran government’s tolerance of
violence against women has specifically contributed to the leading
femicide rate.40 Gangs take advantage of the government’s apathy
toward women and target them for prostitution and sex trafficking if
they refuse to join the gang.41 These gangs, however, often do not
stop with physical harm and sexual assault, but choose to follow
through with death threats.42 In a nation crippled by violence and a
judicial system that refuses to help, children are taking the risk of
fleeing El Salvador by themselves, rather than staying at home.43
Likewise, Honduras suffers from severe violence at the hands of
transnational gangs, who commit acts of murder, extortion, and
kidnapping.44 Honduras also maintains an atmosphere of corruption,
intimidation, and weakness in its justice system, which is
underfunded, poorly staffed, and highly ineffective.45 Even the
Honduran legislature has taken part in the corruption by suspending
the attorney general and removing four magistrates from the
Constitutional Chambers of the Supreme Court, contrary to its
Constitution.46 Criminal prosecutions in Honduras are crippled by a
lack of witness protection, poor evidence brought by the prosecution,
and widespread distrust of the legal system.47 For women, the
problem is particularly serious because violence against women
continuously rises, and perpetrators too often are not convicted.48

39. GENEVA DECLARATION ON ARMED VIOLENCE & DEV., When the Victim Is a
OF ARMED VIOLENCE 113, 119 (2011), available at
http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/GBAV2/GBAV2011_CH4.pdf.
40. Id. at 122.
41. UNHCR, supra note 34, at 4 (recognizing that gangs target “young women
and adolescent girls” for “prostitution and trafficking purposes, or to become sexual
property of gangs”).
42. Id. at 3.
43. Ana Gonzalez-Barrera et al., DHS: Violence, Poverty, is Driving Children to
Flee Central America to U.S., PEW RES. CENTER (July 1, 2014), http://www.pew
research.org/fact-tank/2014/07/01/dhs-violence-poverty-is-driving-children-to-fleecentral-america-to-u-s/.
44. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
HONDURAS 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 1 (2013), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/220663.pdf.
45. Id. at 8. The Department of State explicitly pointed to the lack of internal
controls as a reason for rendering the judicial system susceptible to bribery. Id.
46. Id. at 8-9. In appointing a new attorney general, the Honduran legislation did
not abide by the constitutional process, which required certain selection procedures
by the nominating committee. Id. at 9.
47. Id. (pointing to judicial corruption as another factor).
48. From the year 2005 to 2012, there has been a 246% increase in violent deaths
of women. Id. at 17. Rape, in particular, permeates throughout its society, and is
largely underreported due to a fear of retribution and continued violence. Id. Even
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The excessive level of violence and the breakdown in the judicial
system has given Honduras the top ranking for murder rate in the
world in 2012.49 The statistics become even more sobering when
taking into account the fact that last year 1013 people under the age
of twenty-three were murdered in Honduras, a nation of only eight
million people.50 These soaring murder rates are a major motivator
for the children leaving Honduras.51
Guatemala, too, is crippled by corruption of its police officers and
judicial officials.52 The violence Guatemalan citizens endure comes
from gangs and organized crimes, which is hard to measure given the
corrupt and inadequate judicial system.53 The Guatemalan police
force itself contributes to the high levels of crime, and police impunity
is rampant.54 One of the many failures of the judicial system is the

when the cases were reported, women have not been protected. Id. Between 2008
and 2010, 1010 cases of femicide were heard in court, yet only fifty-six sentences were
handed out. GENEVA DECLARATION ON ARMED VIOLENCE & DEV., supra note 39, at
122.
49. Gonzalez-Barrera et al., supra note 43. To put this into perspective, in 2012
Honduras had a murder rate of 90.4 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, and in the
same year the United States had a murder rate of 4.7 homicides per 100,000
inhabitants. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL STUDY ON
HOMICIDE 2013, at 128 (2014), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/
2014_GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BOOK_web.pdf. Sadly, in 2013 the homicide rate in
Honduras’s industrialized city of San Pedro Sula stood at 187 homicides per 100,000
inhabitants. Gonzalez-Barrera et al., supra note 43. San Pedro Sula’s gang violence
problem has earned it the title of murder capital of the world. Id.
50. Frances Robles, Fleeing Gangs, Children Head to U.S. Border, N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/10/world/americas/fleeing-gangschildren-head-to-us-border.html?_r=0. In her article, Robles describes a late-night
visit to a San Pedro Sula morgue where sixty bodies, all victims of violence, were
piled in a heap, and the technicians explained that they regularly receive corpses of
children under ten, and sometimes as young as two. Id. She goes on to tell the story
of an eleven-year old boy whose throat was slit for not paying a fifty-cent extortion
fee. Id.
51. See generally id. Honduran cities make up more than half of the top fifty
Central American cities of origin for immigrant children here in the United States.
Id. However, almost no children come from Nicaragua, a neighboring country that
suffers from extreme poverty, but does not share Honduras’s gang problem. Id.
52. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
GUATEMALA 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 1 (2014), available at http://www.state.
gov/documents/organization/220657.pdf.
53. Id. at 1; HAL BRANDS, CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND THE CRISIS IN GUATEMALA: A
CASE STUDY IN THE EROSION OF THE STATE 29 (2010), available at http://
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB986.pdf (“[A]ll serious observers
agree that criminal elements have been hugely successful in penetrating the security
forces, judicial institutions, and practically every other office or agency charged with
maintaining law and order.”).
54. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
supra note 52, at 5. There were reports of police officers subjecting Guatemalan
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lack of safety for those involved in the prosecutions.55 Women who
suffer from rape are helpless in seeking the prosecution of their
assailants.56 Sexual predators know this and perpetuate a level of
sexual violence that brings Guatemala’s femicide rate to extremely
high levels.57 The deterioration of Guatemala’s law enforcement has
given the gang population the opportunity to grow to roughly the
same size as the Guatemalan army.58
Gangs in both Guatemala and Central America as a whole target
children for forced recruitment because of the horrible economic
conditions.59 Youths who are poor, homeless, or from marginalized
segments of society are of particular interest to gangs because they
are more vulnerable to forced recruitment, violence, and other
pressures.60 The tactics used by gangs include threats of serious
physical harm or death if they refuse to join the gang, threats to harm
the victim’s family, and threats of rape to female members of the
resistor’s family.61
Even when children are not targeted for
recruitment, they are nevertheless targets for violence. They are

citizens to stops and proceeding to rape and steal from them (those police officers
were not convicted). Id. at 6; see also BRANDS, supra note 53, at 35 (stating that only
twenty-five percent of the population believe the police can be trusted and that
seventy-three percent of urban and suburban residents believe the police are directly
involved in crimes).
55. Judges, witnesses, and prosecutors are the recipients of threats and aggression.
The United States Department of State stated that Guatemala’s judicial system has
failed due to inefficiency, insufficient personnel, and corruption. BUREAU OF
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 52, at 7.
56. The government does not effectively enforce its rape law. BUREAU OF
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 52, at 15
(citing the minimal training and capacity of the police to deal with rape). Through
September 2013, there were 2156 reported cases of sexual or physical assault against
women, yet only 141 of those led to convictions. Id. Femicide, which involves killings
and sexual assault against women and children, had only a one percent to two percent
conviction rate. Id. at 16.
57. GENEVA DECLARATION ON ARMED VIOLENCE & DEV., supra note 39, at 120.
The sexual violence endured by women in Guatemala is related to organized crime
and narco-trafficking. Id. at 114. Guatemala has a femicide rate of over 10 per
100,000 females in the population, which is five times greater than that of Western,
Southern, and Northern European countries. Id. at 119–20.
58. BRANDS, supra note 53, at 23–24.
59. UNHCR, supra note 34, at 4 (recognizing that gangs respond with violence
when met with rejection); see also BRANDS, supra note 53, at 25 (noting the various
ways that gang involvement may be alluring to marginalized children); MICHAEL
BOULTON, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, LIVING IN A WORLD OF
VIOLENCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GANG PHENOMENON 13 (2011) (stating that
forced recruitment only affects significant numbers of children in Central America).
60. UNHCR, supra note 34, at 2, 4.
61. BOULTON, supra note 59, at 16.
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often the victims of gang violence as a form of subjecting their family
members to the gang’s demands.62 For these reasons, Guatemalan
children also flee their home country and make perilous trips to
foreign countries.63
B.

The U.S. Asylum Process

The asylum process can be onerous and complex for any person
seeking protection from the horrors back home. An individual
seeking asylum in the United States may do so either through an
affirmative asylum process or a defensive asylum process.64 The
affirmative asylum process requires that an asylum-seeker be in the
United States and actively apply for asylum.65 To begin the
affirmative asylum process, an individual must apply for asylum with
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
within one year of his or her last arrival in the United States.66 The
individual will then receive an Appointment Notice to visit the
nearest Application Support Center, where the individual will be
fingerprinted and will receive background and security checks.67 The
asylum-seeker then receives notice of a scheduled interview with an
asylum officer.68 At the interview, an asylum-seeker is responsible for
obtaining attorney representation, and if the individual does not
speak English, he or she must obtain an interpreter.69 The interview
generally lasts an hour, where the merits of the asylum-seeker’s
application are scrutinized.70
The asylum officer makes his or her determination about the
asylum-seeker’s application based on meeting certain requirements.71
The asylum-seeker must establish that he or she is eligible for asylum
according to the INA, meets the definition of a refugee under Section

62. See BRANDS, supra note 53, at 27–28 (quoting an interview with an MS-13
gang member, who admits to kidnapping a mother and child, dismembering them,
and sending their body parts to the father in order to get him to pay the gang).
63. Why Are so Many Children Trying to Cross the US Border?, BBC NEWS
(Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-28203923.
64. The Affirmative Asylum Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/affirmative-asylumprocess (last updated Feb. 4, 2015).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.

2015]

ASYLUM FOR THE DEFENSELESS

1073

101(a)(42)(A), and is not barred by Section 208(b)(2) of the INA.72
The asylum officer makes the decision after the interview, and the
individual must return another day to hear the decision.73 If the
application is approved, the applicant is permitted to remain in the
United States, and he or she may apply for lawful permanent
residency and, ultimately, citizenship.74
Unfortunately, it is almost always the case that asylum applications
from individuals fleeing Central America are not granted.75 When the
application is denied, the USCIS places the individual in removal
proceedings and refers the application to an Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR) immigration court for a hearing, where
an immigration judge reviews the claim de novo.76 At this point, the
defensive asylum process begins.77
The defensive asylum process can be used by aliens who are in
removal proceedings for one of two reasons: either their application
was denied by an asylum officer and they were referred to an
immigration court by the USCIS, or they were arrested by the
Department of Homeland Security at the United States-Mexico
border or within the Unites States.78 At a defensive asylum hearing in

72. Id. Section 101(a)(42)(A) will be discussed further below. Section 208(b)(2)
covers exceptions to granting asylum based on an individual’s past criminal activity.
INA § 208(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2) (2012). This Note seeks to argue in favor of
granting asylum for children who are fleeing gang violence and criminal activity
rather than argue in favor of granting asylum for children who have committed such
acts, and therefore Section 208(b)(2) is negligible for purposes of this Note.
73. Affirmative Asylum Process, supra 64.
Importantly, asylum does not
guarantee permanent residence in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2) (2012).
There are a variety of reasons for asylum to be terminated, including a change in
circumstances in his or her country of origin. Id. § 1158(c)(2)(A).
74. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FACT
SHEET: ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL RELIEF, CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE PROTECTIONS (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/09/
AsylumWithholdingCATProtections.pdf.
75. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, OFFICE
OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND TECHNOLOGY, ASYLUM STATISTICS FY 2009–2013, at
31–32 (2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/efoia/FY2009-FY2013Asylum
StatisticsbyNationality.pdf. In 2013, the Executive Office for Immigration Review
received a total of 9898 asylum applications from individuals who had fled
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Id. Of the 9898 applications, the Executive
Office for Immigration Review granted only 426, or 4.3%. See id.
76. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra
note 74, at 3.
77. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-unitedstates (last viewed May 15, 2015).
78. Id. Though there are many ways to enter the United States, migrants from
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras enter the United States through the Mexican
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the immigration court, immigration judges hear asylum cases in an
adversarial fashion.79 The applicant (and, if represented, his or her
attorney), argues against the United States, which is represented by
an attorney from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).80
The immigration judge then determines whether the applicant is
eligible for asylum, and, if so, grants asylum.81 If, however, the
immigration judge denies the applicant’s request, the immigration
judge will inquire as to whether any other forms of relief from
removal are available to the applicant.82 If none are available, the
immigration judge will order that the alien be removed from the
United States.83 The applicant is subsequently removed from the
United States within ninety days of when the removal order becomes
administratively final.84 The applicant will be deported to the country
where the individual boarded the vessel or aircraft to come to the
United States.85 Both parties (the United States and the applicant)
may appeal the immigration judge’s decision to the BIA.86 If the
asylum-seeker contests the BIA’s determination, he or she may
appeal to the federal circuit court of appeals that has jurisdiction over
the claim.87
The disagreement between the United States and an asylum-seeker
in the defensive asylum process is whether the applicant is eligible for
asylum based on the facts presented at the interview with the asylum
officer.88 An applicant must establish that he or she satisfies the
definition of a refugee to be eligible for asylum.89 Only aliens who are
physically present in the United States may apply for asylum.90 To be
granted asylum, an applicant bears the burden of establishing that he

border and endure an extremely perilous journey. Paulina Villegas & Randal C.
Archibold, Mexico Makes Route Tougher for Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/world/americas/mexico-makes-route-tougher-formigrants.html?_r=0.
79. See The Affirmative Asylum Process, supra note 64.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)–(B)(i) (2012).
85. Id. § 1231(b)(1)(A).
86. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note
74, at 4.
87. Id.
88. See The Affirmative Asylum Process, supra note 64.
89. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012).
90. Id. § 1158(a)(1).
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or she is a refugee.91 As highlighted above, to establish refugee status
an applicant must show that he or she is outside the country of his or
her nationality, and that he or she “is unable or unwilling to return to,
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection
of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.”92
In essence, according to Section 1101(a)(42), an asylum-seeker
must prove three elements to establish refugee status: (1) that the
alien has suffered past persecution or maintains a well-founded fear
of persecution; (2) that one of the five enumerated categories93 is a
central reason for the persecution; and (3) that the persecution is
perpetuated by an organization that the government is unable or
unwilling to control.94
The second element is a particularly
controversial area in asylum law, where the circuit courts have
disagreed on whether children fleeing from gangs in Central America
satisfies one of the five enumerated categories (namely, membership
in a particular group).95 The BIA created a test to determine whether
individuals should be granted asylum, which has evolved over the
years but has not been uniformly accepted.96

91. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). There are many exceptions in the INA for obtaining
asylum. See id. § 1158(b)(2)(A). However, this Note will not discuss these
exceptions, as they do not pertain to the issue this Note attempts to resolve.
92. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012). There are other ways to establish refugee
status. However, this Note will not discuss them because they do not pertain to the
issue at hand. Additionally, the requirement that the alien prove that he or she is
outside his or her country will always be established for asylum purposes because
asylum may only be granted when the alien is physically in the United States. See 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). Therefore, an important distinction is that an alien may be a
refugee without having the protection of asylum because refugee status requires only
being outside of his or her country of nationality. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
93. The five enumerated categories are race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion. Id. § 1101(a)(42).
94. Y.V.Z. v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 492 F. App’x 291, 292–93 (3d Cir. 2012).
95. See discussion infra Part II.B.
96. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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II. CONFLICTING VIEWS ON THE PROPER ASYLUM TEST
A. The Evolution of the Definition of “Membership in a
Particular Social Group”

1.

The Board of Immigration Appeals Takes the First Step: Acosta

To reiterate, an asylum-seeker must establish that he or she
suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future
persecution on account of any one of the five enumerated categories
in order to be granted asylum.97 This Note will focus on the category
of “membership in a particular group.”98 The BIA uses a three-step
analysis when reviewing applications for asylum based on
“membership in a particular group.” The first requirement was
created in the seminal case In re Acosta.99 In In re Acosta, the
respondent, a thirty-six-year-old man from El Salvador, entered the
United States without inspection and stood to be removed.100 The
respondent applied for asylum, but the immigration judge denied his
application.101 On appeal, the BIA considered his application for
asylum, and, in doing so, articulated the first requirement for asylum
applicants seeking to establish refugee status under the INA via
“membership in a particular social group.”102
Before relocating to the United States, the respondent in In re
Acosta formed a taxi company with fellow drivers to be operated in
San Salvador, El Salvador.103 The founders, including the respondent,
managed the company and continued to drive their taxis.104 The taxi
company began to receive anonymous phone calls and notes believed
to be from anti-government guerillas requesting that the taxi
company cease its services.105 After refusing to comply with the
requests, the individuals working for the taxi company began to
receive threats of retaliation, which were later carried out.106

97. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 229–30 (B.I.A. 2014).
98. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Membership in a particular group has generated much
jurisprudence and inconsistency given the variety of definitions purported by asylumseekers. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 231.
99. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 211 (B.I.A. 1985) (overruled in part by In re
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 439 (B.I.A. 1987)).
100. Id. at 213.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 216.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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Eventually, the respondent began to receive threats at his home, and
was later attacked in his taxicab.107 After the attack, the respondent
fled El Salvador because he feared for his life and traveled to the
United States, where he applied for asylum.108
The BIA evaluated the validity of the respondent’s claim of
“membership in a particular social group,” which he framed as taxi
drivers from the respondent’s company and persons engaged in the
transportation industry of El Salvador.109 Given the sparse evidence
of congressional intent as to the meaning of “membership in a
particular social group,” the BIA used its tools of statutory
construction.110 The BIA applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis and
determined that the other four categories described persecution
aimed at an immutable characteristic.111 The BIA defined an
“immutable characteristic” as “a characteristic that either is beyond
the power of an individual to change or is so fundamental to
individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be
changed.”112 Thus, persecution on account of membership in a
particular social group requires a showing of persecution directed
toward an individual whom is a member of a group that shares a
common, immutable characteristic.113 The BIA explained:
The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color,
or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past
experience such as former military leadership or land ownership.
The particular kind of group characteristic that will qualify under
this construction remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
However, whatever the common characteristic that defines the
group, it must be one that the members of the group either cannot
change, or should not be required to change because it is
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.114

Applying this newly established definition for a particular social
group, the BIA found that the respondent did not belong to a
particular social group because taxi drivers could change professions,
and therefore the purported group did not possess an immutable

107. Id. at 217.
108. Id. at 213.
109. Id. at 232. COTAXI is the name of the taxi company that the respondent cofounded. Id. at 216.
110. Id. at 232–33.
111. Id. at 233.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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characteristic.115 The common, immutable characteristic requirement
would henceforth be applied to every particular social group that was
proposed at asylum hearings because of the BIA’s precedential
authority.116 Eventually, this requirement would be examined by the
Supreme Court of the United States and become established as a
bedrock principle in asylum law.117

2.

The Supreme Court Defers to the BIA

In INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre,118 the Supreme Court of the United
States explicitly held that the BIA should be given the appropriate
deference in its interpretation of the INA.119 The respondent in
Aguirre-Aguirre was a Guatemalan native who had participated in
various crimes in his home country.120 The BIA interpreted the INA
and determined that the respondent was removable because the INA
barred him from the relief he sought.121 The respondent appealed to
the Ninth Circuit, and the circuit court determined that the BIA had
incorrectly interpreted the INA.122 The Supreme Court then granted
certiorari to determine whether the Ninth Circuit correctly
interpreted the INA and took this opportunity to solidify the level of
deference attributed to the BIA when interpreting the INA.123
The Supreme Court began its analysis in Aguirre-Aguirre by
plainly stating that the BIA was entitled to Chevron deference124

115. Id. at 234.
116. See Precedent Decisions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
http://www.uscis.gov/laws/precedent-decisions (last updated Sept. 10, 2013).
117. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
118. 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
119. Id. at 424–25 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984)). The applicant in this case was seeking to withhold the removal
proceedings, which is similar to seeking asylum, albeit a more difficult burden of
proof. However, the case stands for a broader, and more relevant, proposition,
namely that the BIA is entitled to deference for its interpretation of the INA’s
provisions. Id. at 425.
120. Id. at 418. Specifically, the petitioner set fires to buses, assaulted passengers,
and vandalized shops. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 424.
124. Chevron deference dictates that whenever a court reviews an agency’s
interpretation of a statute, the court must answer two questions. Chevron, 467 U.S. at
842. The court must first determine whether Congress has spoken on the precise
issue at hand. Id. If Congress has clearly stated its intent, the court and agency must
give effect to that intent. Id. at 842–43. If Congress has not spoken on the precise
issue, the court may not put forth its own interpretation of the statute but rather must
proceed to the next question. Id. Next, the court must determine if the agency’s
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because the Ninth Circuit was confronted with issues that implicated
the BIA’s construction of the INA.125 The Court pointed to explicit
language in the INA, which charged the Attorney General with the
administration and enforcement of the Act.126 It then explained that
Section 1253(h) of the INA granted decision-making authority to the
Attorney General.127 Lastly, the Court noted that the Attorney
General had vested the BIA with “the discretion and authority
conferred upon the Attorney General by law” in “considering and
determining cases before it.”128 Aguirre-Aguirre set the path for
circuit courts to defer to the BIA’s determination, and, subsequently,
the BIA has been cited approvingly by the circuit courts for its
decision in In re Acosta.129
The Supreme Court has not given its own interpretation of Section
1158; rather, the Court stated that the provision should gain its
meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication.130 Thus,
circuit courts apply the BIA’s standards to every asylum application
in their individual discretion, which consequently promotes confusion
and inconsistency in the application of Section 1158.131 A main force
behind this inconsistency is the fact that circuit courts review the issue
of whether an applicant is a member of a particular social group
under the INA de novo, while giving Chevron deference to the BIA’s
interpretation of the statute.132 Specifically, the circuit courts have
departed from the BIA’s last two prongs in its three-step test.133
interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 843. Essentially, the
court will be prohibited from substituting its own construction of a statute so long as
the agency has made a reasonable interpretation. Id. at 844.
125. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424.
126. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (1994)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 425 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1) (1998)).
129. See, e.g., Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1196, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2005)
(deferring to the BIA’s interpretation of membership in a particular social group in
Acosta and citing to Aguirre-Aguirre); Silva v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2005)
(giving Chevron deference according to Aguirre-Aguirre, and applying the BIA’s
definition of membership in a particular social group in Acosta).
130. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987).
131. See Cruz-Funez v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 2005) (“The courts
are struggling to set the parameters for the definition of a ‘particular social group’ in
light of Acosta. The circuit courts are not in agreement on a test.”).
132. See, e.g., Chavez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 571 F. App’x 861, 863–64 (11th Cir.
2014) (holding that the BIA’s legal determinations are reviewed de novo, but are
given Chevron deference); Karki v. Holder, 715 F.3d 792, 800 (10th Cir. 2013)
(holding that the BIA’s decisions on purely legal questions are reviewed de novo);
Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 668 (7th Cir. 2013) (giving Chevron deference to
statutory interpretation, but holding that whether a group constitutes a particular
social group is a question of law that is reviewed de novo); Castaneda-Castillo v.
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The BIA’s Social Distinction and Particularity Requirements

After In re Acosta, the BIA named two separate requirements that
must be met in order for an asylum applicant to establish
“membership in a particular social group”—“social distinction” and
“particularity.”134 The first of these two requirements is “social
distinction,” articulated in In Re C-A-.135 In Re C-A- revolved
around the respondent, a Colombian baker, who had fled his country
because he feared persecution by the Cali drug cartel.136 The
respondent applied for asylum based upon his “membership in a
particular social group,” namely, noncriminal informants who had
informed against the cartel.137 In denying his application for asylum,
the BIA focused on whether the purported group was socially
distinct.138
“Social distinction” is found when the group is recognized as such
by others in society.139 For example, social groups based on an innate
characteristic such as sex are recognizable social groups in society.140
When determining whether the “social distinction” requirement is
met, the relevant factor is the extent to which members of the
community perceive those with the common, immutable

Holder, 638 F.3d 354, 363 (1st Cir. 2011) (explaining that the ordinary remand rule
applies to issues not yet decided by the BIA, but de novo review is appropriate to the
BIA’s decisions on the issue of a particular social group definition because it is a
“pure issue of law”); Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 124 (4th Cir. 2011)
(holding that the BIA’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo and receive
substantial, but not unlimited, deference); Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1096–97
(9th Cir. 2011) (holding that whether a group constitutes a particular social group
under the Immigration and Nationality Act is reviewed de novo); ValdiviezoGaldamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that
questions of law are reviewed de novo, and the BIA’s statutory interpretations
receive Chevron deference); Malonga v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 546, 553 (8th Cir. 2008)
(elucidating that defining a particular social group presents a question of law, which is
reviewed de novo, but according substantial deference to the BIA’s statutory
interpretations).
133. See discussion infra Part II.A.4.
134. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 232 (B.I.A. 2014).
135. 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959–60 (B.I.A. 2006). In Re C-A- uses the term social
“visibility,” but the most recent BIA case on the matter renamed the term socially
“distinct” as a way of clarifying the requirement. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at
236. Although case law uses the old term “socially visible,” this Note will refer to the
requirement by its new name, “social distinction,” for the same purpose the BIA
chose to rename the term: clarity.
136. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 952–53.
137. Id. at 953.
138. Id. at 959–61.
139. Id. at 959.
140. Id.
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characteristic in question as members of a social group.141 In In Re CA-, the BIA held that social distinction is limited to informants who
are discovered because they appeared as witnesses, and since the
respondent had not participated as a witness, he was no different than
anyone else who crosses the cartel’s path.142
The second requirement that must be satisfied to establish
persecution on account of membership in a particular social group is
particularity.143 The BIA, in the landmark case In Re A-M-E- & J-GU-, explained that a social group must be defined with particularity so
as not to be amorphous.144 In that case, the respondents were a
married couple from Guatemala who came to the United States for
economic opportunity and to be with their family.145 The couple
applied for asylum when faced with removal proceedings, arguing
that they would be threatened and harassed by organized political
gangs if they were to return.146 They attempted to establish refugee
status by demonstrating that they were members of a particular social
group, namely, affluent Guatemalans.147 In holding that “affluent
Guatemalans” do not satisfy the “particularity” requirement, the BIA
clarified that this requirement is meant to avoid definitions which are
indeterminate, thereby preventing the population of the social group
from varying.148 Furthermore, the BIA asserted that the characteristic
describing the social group may not be too subjective or inchoate.149
Essentially, when determining if the proposed description is
sufficiently particular, an individual should ask if the definition is “too
amorphous to provide an adequate benchmark for determining group
membership.”150 These two new requirements, “social distinction”
and “particularity,” were added to the common, immutable
characteristic test, and applied to asylum cases by the BIA.151

141. Id. at 957 (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 960.
143. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014).
144. 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007).
145. Id. at 70.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 73.
148. Id. at 76. The BIA denied a social group based on affluent Guatemalans
because of the possibility the group’s numbers could vary from one percent to twenty
percent of the country’s population. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 232 (B.I.A. 2014).
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However, circuit courts did not unanimously accept these two new
requirements.152

4.

The Circuit Courts Disagree on the Appropriate Deference
Level

The evolution of the BIA’s analysis of asylum applications caused
the circuit courts to begin to diverge from one another.153 While the
common, immutable characteristic test remained solidified by the
Supreme Court of the United States,154 the introduction of two new
requirements caused some circuit courts to question the appropriate
deference level for these new prongs.155 A majority of the circuit
courts, however, extended deference to the entire three-step test
using the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Aguirre-Aguirre.156

a.

The First Circuit Upholds the BIA’s Test

In Mayorga-Vidal v. Holder,157 the First Circuit made clear that it
would afford deference to the BIA’s requirements of “membership in
a particular social group.”158 Mayorga–Vidal, who was approximately
fourteen or fifteen years old, encountered MS-13 members.159 These
gang members attempted to recruit him on multiple occasions.160
When Mayorga-Vidal would refuse, the gang members responded
with threats of violence.161 Five months after gang members, who
were trying to recruit him, threatened to end his life, Mayorga-Vidal
fled to the United States and sought asylum.162
The social group definition in question was “young Salvadorian
men who have resisted gang recruitment and whose parents are

152. See discussion infra Part II.A.4.
153. See discussion infra Part II.A.4.
154. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999) (citing Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
155. See, e.g., Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 668 (7th Cir. 2013); ValdiviezoGaldamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 608 (3d Cir. 2011).
156. See, e.g., Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 520–21 (5th Cir. 2012)
(citing Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424).
157. 675 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2012). The case was on appeal after the BIA dismissed the
applicant’s asylum claim. Id. at 13.
158. Id. at 14 (“The term ‘particular social group,’ 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), is not
defined by statute, and we accord deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the
bounds of this phrase.”).
159. Id. at 12.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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unavailable to protect them.”163 The court embraced the BIA’s threepart test to determine the validity of the proposed social group.164
Upon rejecting the asserted social group, the First Circuit reasoned
that young men without familial support are not viewed as distinct
within society.165
The court argued that the familial support
characteristic encourages a subjective interpretation, and in doing so
fails to comply with the BIA’s requirements.166 The imposition of
subjective interpretation and the want of boundaries, the court
determined, made the purported group inconsistent with the
particularity and social distinction requirements.167 Other circuits
have joined the First Circuit in embracing the BIA’s three-part test
for membership in a particular social group under the INA.168

b.

The Fourth Circuit Applies the BIA’s Three-Step Test

The Fourth Circuit, however, has reacted differently. Notably, this
court uses the BIA’s three-step framework.169 It does not, however,
explicitly embrace the “social distinction” requirement; rather, it
found no need to question the requirement’s validity under the INA
because the asylum claims are dismissed for failure to meet the
163. Id. at 11
164. See id. at 14 (accepting the common, immutable characteristic, social
distinction, and particularity requirements); see also De Carvalho-Frois v. Holder,
667 F.3d 69, 73 (1st Cir. 2012); Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir.
2010).
165. Mayorga-Vidal, 675 F.3d at 16. The court elaborated on its position, and
explained that there can be many reasons for a young man in El Salvador to be
without familial support. Id.
166. Id. at 17. Of particular concern was where a line would be drawn between
youths that have familial protection and those who do not. Id.
167. Id. at 15.
168. See Chavez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 571 F. App’x 861, 864 (11th Cir. 2014)
(stating the court must defer to the BIA’s interpretation in accordance with
Chevron); Umaña-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 671 (6th Cir. 2013) (giving
deference to the BIA’s requirements); Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511,
520–21 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the particularity and social distinction
requirements are entitled to Chevron deference); Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678, 681
(8th Cir. 2012) (holding that the particularity and social distinction requirements are
not arbitrary and capricious); Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 652 (10th
Cir. 2012) (accepting the BIA’s requirements); Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749,
753 (8th Cir. 2011) (using the BIA’s three-step test in its analysis); Bonilla-Morales v.
Holder, 607 F.3d 1132, 1137 (6th Cir. 2010) (requiring both social distinction and
particularity to establish membership in a particular social group); Ucelo-Gomez v.
Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73-74 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the BIA’s analysis was
consistent with its precedent, and therefore entitled to Chevron deference).
169. Zelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Scatambuli v.
Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2009)) (stating the social distinction requirement is
relevant).
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particularity threshold.170 Notwithstanding its use of the social
distinction prong, the Fourth Circuit continues to avoid explicitly
accepting or rejecting the requirement.171 For example, in CrespinValladares v. Holder, the Fourth Circuit incorporates a footnote
where it assures the reader that the validity of the “social distinction”
requirement is not in question, and, therefore, it would not weigh in
on the issue.172 This tactic was repeated again in Zelaya v. Holder,
where the court included another footnote, which reiterated that the
court had not yet decided whether the requirement comported with
the INA.173 Recently, the Fourth Circuit removed all doubt that it
would not determine whether the BIA was entitled to Chevron
deference for its “social distinction” test by explicitly declining to
make such a decision in the text of an opinion.174

c.

The Ninth Circuit Provides Its Own Asylum Test

The Ninth Circuit has taken a different approach than the BIA and
its sister circuits, including the First and the Fourth.175 This court
requires the asylum-seeker to establish “membership in a particular
social group” on one of two grounds: (1) by putting forth a group that
is united by a voluntary association,176 or (2) by satisfying the BIA’s
three-pronged test.177 The Ninth Circuit places a restriction on what
seems to be an all-inclusive, two-optioned test. The purported group
cannot be defined by a sweeping demographic division where its
individual members manifest “a plethora of different lifestyles,
varying interests, diverse cultures, and contrary political leanings.”178
The court has held that a group is too broadly defined when it lacks a
unifying relationship or characteristic which narrows the diverse and
disconnected group.179 Last, the Ninth Circuit’s approach does not
170. Id.
171. Id. at 169 (Floyd, J., concurring).
172. Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 125 n.5 (4th Cir. 2011).
173. Zelaya, 668 F.3d at 165 n.4.
174. See Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 910 (4th Cir. 2014) (“While we have
endorsed both the immutability and particularity criteria . . . we have explicitly
declined to determine whether the social [distinction] criterion is a reasonable
interpretation of the INA.”) (citing Zelaya, 668 F.3d at 165 n.4).
175. See generally Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000),
overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th Cir.
2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 183 (2006).
176. This includes former associations as well.
177. See Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 2010); see also HernandezMontiel, 225 F.3d at 1093.
178. See Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 668.
179. Id.
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put a limit on how large the group may be, so long as it satisfies its
test.180 When using the BIA’s test, the Ninth Circuit takes a broad
view on what groups constitute a particular social group.181 For
example, the court has held that a group defined as females of a
particular country can satisfy the BIA’s requirements to be a
particular social group.182

d.

The Seventh Circuit Rejects “Social Distinction”

The Seventh Circuit has opposed the BIA’s “social distinction”
prerequisite.183 The rejection of the “social distinction” requirement
stems from the view that the requirement is inconsistent with prior
BIA decisions, and does not necessarily follow from an interpretation
of the INA.184 The Seventh Circuit cites to cases where the BIA
makes no mention of social distinction, yet finds an asserted group to
constitute a particular social group.185 Implicit in its holding is the
idea that because the BIA is inconsistent with its use of the “social
distinction” requirement, the BIA is not worthy of deference.186 This
analysis requires obedience to the principle that a circuit court cannot
defer to an agency when the agency has been inconsistent, because it
may lead to arbitrariness and usurp the agency’s responsibilities.187
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has also rejected the “social
distinction” precondition on the ground that it is nonsensical.188 The

180. Id. at 669. The court clarified that the size and breadth of a group cannot be
the sole reason for denying asylum under the category of membership in a particular
social group. See id. at 669 (emphasis added).
181. See Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797 (9th Cir. 2005).
182. See id. The court boldly stated that in some circumstances females in general
may constitute a particular social group as a logical application of asylum law. See id.;
see also Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 667. The Ninth Circuit has also held that broad groups
based on sexual orientation and sexual identity constitute a particular social group.
Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Karouni v.
Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that all alien homosexuals are
members of a particular social group).
183. See Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 668 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating applicants do
not need to show that they would be recognized as members of a social group); see
also Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009).
184. See Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615–16.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 615. The court notes that it recognizes the Supreme Court has given
Chevron deference to the BIA but states that with regard to the social distinction
requirement the BIA has been inconsistent. Id.
187. Id. at 616 (citing AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 452 F.3d 830, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Idaho
Power Co. v. FERC, 312 F.3d 454, 461–62 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (rejecting an agency’s
interpretation because it is inconsistent and nonsensical)).
188. Id.
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court explains that “social distinction” is something that is impossible
to detect, and in some cases, individuals will go to great lengths to
ensure they are not socially distinct.189

e.

The Third Circuit Rejects the BIA’s Additional Requirements

The Third Circuit, alternatively, rejects the BIA’s additional
qualifications and argues that neither the “particularity” nor the
“social distinction” requirement is entitled to Chevron deference.190
With respect to the “social distinction” requirement, the Third Circuit
criticizes the BIA for not using the requirement in any of its prior
cases where a purported group was held to constitute a particular
social group.191 The court has pointed out that certain characteristics
have survived the common, immutable characteristic test, but are
internal and cannot be known by others in society unless and until the
individual makes the characteristic known.192
For example, a
homosexual individual’s sexual orientation is an immutable
characteristic, which is common among members of the homosexual
community, but the presence of the characteristic would be unknown
to society until a homosexual individual makes it known.193 Thus,
under this view, since the “social distinction” requirement is
inconsistent with prior BIA decisions, it is an unreasonable addition
to the BIA’s test to establish refugee status vis-à-vis a particular social
group.194 This court mimics the Seventh Circuit’s additional reason
for rejecting the “social distinction” requirement,195 under the theory
that to apply the social distinction prong to individuals who go
through great lengths to avoid persecution by blending into society
would be nonsensical.196

189. Id. Prime examples are the cases of women who belong to tribes that practice
female genital mutilation. In those cases, women would undoubtedly conceal their
opposition to those practices, and it is fair to say that they would refuse to
acknowledge such a group’s existence or that they belong to such a group, since the
alternative would be to paint a target on themselves. Id. at 616.
190. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 608 (3d Cir.
2011).
191. See id. at 604.
192. Id. (arguing that these characteristics would not pass the social distinction
test).
193. See id.
194. Id.; see also Y.V.Z. v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 492 Fed. App’x 291, 295–96 (3d
Cir. 2012).
195. The Third Circuit spent over a full page explaining in depth why the Seventh
Circuit rejected social distinction. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 604–06.
196. See id. at 607.
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The Third Circuit, however, adds a new position to the controversy
by rejecting the “particularity” requirement as well.197 Under the
Third Circuit’s approach, “particularity” is nothing more than a
rewording of the “social distinction” qualification, and thus, the
former is rejected for the same reasons as the latter.198 Therefore,
according to this court, the “particularity” requirement is also
unreasonable because of the BIA’s inconsistency in applying it to
asserted social groups.199 Ultimately, this leads to the conclusion that
neither the “particularity” nor the “social distinction” requirement
are entitled to Chevron deference.200 The Third Circuit has further
opined that the BIA cannot depart from its announced rule without
giving a principled reason.201 In doing so, the court has asserted, the
agency acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or in an abuse of discretion.202
Unfortunately, the trouble does not end here, as the circuit courts are
not unanimous as to how a test, or lack thereof, applies to the many
children fleeing their home countries because of the ubiquitous gang
violence.
B.

1.

Membership in a Particular Social Group in the Context of
Central American Gangs

The BIA Takes a Position on Gang Related Asylum Claims

Two years after announcing its three-part test in In Re C-A-,203 the
BIA had an opportunity to take a position on gang related asylum
claims. In In re S-E-G-,204 the BIA addressed the issue of children
resisting gang recruitment for the first time.205 The respondent, a
nineteen-year-old woman with two sixteen-year-old brothers, lived in
El Salvador.206 MS-13, the dominant gang in their town, harassed,
robbed, and beat the boys for refusing to join their gang.207 MS-13
members then threatened to rape the female respondent if the boys

197. Id. at 608.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959–60 (B.I.A. 2006).
204. 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008).
205. See generally id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 580. Armed gang members also threatened the boys to join the gang or
their bodies were to end up in a dumpster someday. Id.
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did not join their gang.208 News of a young boy who was shot and
killed by the gang for refusing to join the gang further inspired fear in
the siblings.209 The respondent and her brothers never reported the
incidents to the police for fear of retaliation and the belief that the
police would not provide assistance.210
In U.S. removal proceedings, the respondents sought asylum based
upon “membership in a particular social group,” but the immigration
judge ruled that the beatings and threats were based on the gang’s
desire to recruit new members, rather than to punish the respondents
for their membership in a particular social group.211 On appeal, the
respondent attempted to convince the BIA that the siblings were in
fact persecuted because they belonged to a particular social group,
“Salvadoran youth who have been subjected to recruitment efforts by
MS-13 and who have rejected or resisted membership in the gang
based on their own personal, moral, and religious opposition to the
gang’s values and activities.”212
In denying the asylum application, the BIA scrutinized the
respondents’ definition of a particular social group vigorously, using
both the “particularity” and “social distinction” requirements, and
found that the definition failed to satisfy those conditions.213 The
BIA stated that the proposed definition did not satisfy the
“particularity” requirement because the terms of the group were
amorphous, and there was no evidence showing that gangs limited
their efforts to male children who resist gang recruitment based on
their personal, moral, or religious opposition to gang activity.214
Another fatal issue for the respondents was the lack of evidence that
gang members focused their efforts to punish individuals with the
asserted characteristics.215 Additionally, the BIA reasoned that the
purported social group constituted a potentially large and diffuse
segment of society, and that the gang’s motivation for targeting and

208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 581.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 584–88. Importantly, the BIA explained that claims for asylum based on
age may be cognizable. Id. at 583–84. The BIA argued that although youth may
change and an individual may no longer be considered young through the passage of
time, youth may still be considered an immutable characteristic because it is out of
the control of any individual. Id.
214. Id. at 585. The terms were considered amorphous because people’s ideas of
their meaning may vary. Id.
215. Id.

2015]

ASYLUM FOR THE DEFENSELESS

1089

recruiting the boys could be completely different than the fact that
they belonged to the group.216
In In re S-E-G-, the BIA determined that the respondents also
failed to satisfy the “social distinction” requirement.217 The BIA held
that Salvadoran youths who have resisted gang recruitment are not
socially distinct because there was little evidence that the community
perceived them as a group, or that they experienced a higher
incidence of crime than the rest of the population.218 Since gangs are
known to retaliate against anyone who would interfere with their
criminal enterprise, the BIA found that male children who resist gang
recruitment are in the same position as every other person who is a
threat to the gang’s interest, and therefore not socially distinct.219
Thus, the BIA held that “young Salvadorans who have been subject
to recruitment efforts by criminal gangs, but who have refused to join
for personal, religious, or moral reasons . . . do[] not qualify as a
particular social group.”220
The most recent adjudication on the topic of individuals fleeing
Central America due to gang-forced recruitment tactics came in 2014
in In re M-E-V-G-.221 Echoing its rationale in In re S-E-G-, the BIA
denied the asylum application of a Honduran youth who, along with
his family, was kidnapped and beaten by members of a gang while
traveling. The gang then threatened to kill him if he refused to join
them.222 After the incident, the gang threw rocks and spears at him
and shot at him, two to three times per week.223 The BIA reasoned
that despite certain segments of a population being more susceptible

216. Id.
217. Id. at 588.
218. Id.
219. Id. “Notably, neither the 2004 Country Reports, nor more recent reports,
mention forced recruitment by gang members or persecution against individuals who
resist the gang, and the respondents have not submitted evidence that persuades us
that gangs commit violent acts for reasons other than gaining more influence and
power, and recruiting young males to fill their ranks.” Id. at 587–88.
220. Id. at 588. Shortly after In re S-E-G-, the BIA was confronted with a broad
definition, persons resistant to gang membership, in In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec.
591 (B.I.A. 2008), which was also rejected for not being socially distinct. See id. at
594–95. The BIA found that membership in a larger group of people who are
resistant to gangs is of no concern to anyone in Honduras or the gangs. Id. at 595.
While admitting that young, urban males in Honduras might well be suspected by
others in the community to have been approached by gangs seeking their
membership, and to have refused, the BIA held that a purely statistical showing is
insufficient to establish existence of a social group. Id.
221. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 229–30 (B.I.A. 2014).
222. Id. at 228.
223. Id.
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to a particular type of criminal activity than others, members of the
community all suffer from a gang’s criminal efforts to maintain its
presence in the area.224 Before concluding, however, the BIA
cautioned that its precedents are not blanket rejections of asylum
claims involving gangs.225 Although children fleeing Honduras, El
Salvador, and Guatemala have not been able to create a social group
at the adjudicatory level, the circuit courts have not been unanimous
in their rulings on the issue.226 The First and Fourth Circuits, like the
vast majority of the circuit courts, have supported the BIA in denying
asylum claims of children fleeing Central American gang violence.227

2.

The First and Fourth Circuits Agree and Deny Asylum

The First Circuit addressed the issue of children fleeing Central
American gang violence in Mendez-Barrera v. Holder.228 In MendezBarrera, Yulma, a native of El Salvador, was approached by gang
members who attempted to recruit her and threatened sexual abuse if

224. Id. at 250–51. The BIA explained that gangs may target one segment of the
population for recruitment, another for extortion, and yet others for kidnapping and
drug trafficking. Id. at 250.
225. Id. at 251.
226. Though most courts have expressed their views on the issue, there are some
circuit courts that have avoided the issue by deferring to the BIA. In Ucelo-Gomez
v. Mukasey, the Second Circuit joined the majority of circuits in granting Chevron
deference to the BIA. 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007). However, the Second Circuit
has quickly dismissed all appeals it received concerning children fleeing Central
America because of gang recruitment tactics with a series of unpublished summary
orders citing Ucelo-Gomez. See, e.g., Oliva-Flores v. Holder, 477 F. App’x 774, 775–
76 (2d Cir. 2012); Vasquez v. Holder, 343 F. App’x 681, 682–83 (2d Cir. 2009);
Aguilar-Guerra v. Holder, 343 F. App’x 640, 641–42 (2d Cir. 2009); Lemus-Lemus v.
Holder, 343 F. App’x 643, 644–45 (2d Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit has used a similar
strategy. In Barrios v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit articulated that it would provide
Chevron deference to the BIA with regard to its decision of whether individuals
resisting gang recruitment constitute a particular social group. 581 F.3d 849, 854–55
(9th Cir. 2009). Once the court made clear that it would provide deference, it began
to dismiss all asylum claims that had even a hint of the similar characteristics in a
thick stream of memoranda. See, e.g., Andrade-Quiroz v. Holder, 444 F. App’x 122,
123 (9th Cir. 2011); Orellana-Martinez v. Holder, 411 F. App’x 19, 20 (9th Cir. 2010);
Mazariegos-Diaz v. Holder, 362 F. App’x 794, 795 (9th Cir. 2010); Garcia-Galvez v.
Holder, 361 F. App’x 755, 756 (9th Cir. 2010); Cabrera-Rodriguez v. Holder, 351 F.
App’x 204, 205 (9th Cir. 2009).
227. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
228. 602 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2010). Though this case entails a female respondent, the
First Circuit has used this case to deny asylum applications for men that are based on
similar facts. See, e.g., Mayorga-Vidal v. Holder, 675 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2012); Larios
v. Holder, 608 F.3d 105, 109 (1st Cir. 2010). Therefore, for purposes of the First
Circuit, the same analysis applies to both males and females. See Mayorga-Vidal, 675
F.3d at 15 (“[T]he same analysis applies . . . .”).
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she refused.229 Gang members continued their harassment and
attacked Yulma’s brother to pressure her to join.230 Then, gang
members threw rocks at her house, which caused the roof to warp and
buckle.231 Yulma no longer felt safe and fled to the United States
through Mexico.232 The Department of Homeland Security initiated
removal proceedings against her, where she applied for asylum.233
Yulma argued that she was a refugee because she was a member of a
particular social group, “young women recruited by gang members
who resist such recruitment.”234 After appealing the immigration
judge’s denial, the BIA held that group invalid because it did not
meet the “particularity” and “social distinction” requirements.235
On appeal, the First Circuit analyzed the validity of Yulma’s
purported social group.236
The court focused on the “social
distinction” requirement first and required Yulma to demonstrate
that the group was recognized in the community as a cohesive
group.237 The First Circuit found that none of the characteristics of
her group rendered its members socially distinct in El Salvador.238
Moving next to the “particularity” requirement, Yulma’s group was
also found to be unsatisfactory.239 According to the First Circuit, it is
impossible to identify who is or is not a young woman recruited by
gang members who resists such recruitment.240 Of particular concern
to the court was who would be considered young, what type of
conduct constituted recruitment, and the degree to which an
individual must resist such recruitment.241 The characteristics were
held to be ambiguous and subjective, which was fatal to Yulma’s
claim.242 For these reasons, the First Circuit upheld the BIA’s
ruling.243

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 2010).

Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. at 26–27.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 28.
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The Fourth Circuit agrees with the First Circuit in believing that
the “particularity” requirement is not satisfied for these types of
purported social groups.244 In Solomon-Membreno v. Holder, Jorge
and his sister Fatima, the brave children discussed in the Introduction
to this Note, left El Salvador because of constant fear of harassment,
alleged rape, and beatings inflicted by MS-13.245
In removal
proceedings, Jorge argued that he belonged to the social
group, “young
Salvadoran
students
who
expressly
oppose gang practices and values and wish to protect their families
against such practices.”246 In determining the outcome of the case, the
Fourth Circuit focused on the “particularity” requirement.247 In
affirming the BIA’s denial of asylum, the court explained that the
proposed social group lacked particularity because it did not provide
a means to determine what actions were sufficient to oppose MS-13.248
Filing a police report, expressing anti-gang sentiment through the
media, and participating in city-wide anti-gang protests could all be
considered opposing gang practices, the court reasoned, but do not
provide an adequate benchmark for determining group
membership.249 The vast majority of circuit courts have engaged in
similar analyses and subsequently denied asylum to these children.250

244. Solomon-Membreno v. Holder, 578 F. App’x 300, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).
245. Id. at 302.
246. Id. at 304.
247. Id. at 304. The Fourth Circuit seems to use the particularity prong as its main
method of striking the asylum claims based on these facts. See, e.g., Zelaya v. Holder,
668 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2012). The court analogized opposing gangs to refusing to
join a gang, and subsequently held that the characteristic is too amorphous for the
same reasons. See id.
248. Solomon-Membreno, 578 F. App’x at 306.
249. Id. at 306.
250. See, e.g., De Leon-Saj v. Holder, 583 F. App’x 429, 430 (5th Cir. 2014)
(holding that such groups are overly-broad and do not distinguish between members
and non-members); Umaña-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 673–74 (6th Cir. 2013)
(finding such groups do not meet the particularity and social distinction
requirements); Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 521–22 (5th Cir. 2012)
(holding that such groups lack particularity and social distinction); Gaitan v. Holder,
671 F.3d 678, 682 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding that the asylum-seeker is not socially
distinct from any other Salvadoran that experiences gang violence); Ortiz-Puentes v.
Holder, 662 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that a group defined as
Guatemalans who refused to join a gang and were persecuted as a result does not
meet the particularity and social distinction requirement); Turcios-Avila v. U.S.
Attorney Gen., 362 F. App’x 37, 42 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that young Honduran
men who refuse to join gangs do not even pass the immutable characteristic analysis);
Gomez-Benitez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 295 F. App’x 324, 326 (11th Cir. 2008)
(holding that “Honduran schoolboys who conscientiously refuse to join gangs” are
not a socially distinct group and do not satisfy particularity because recognition of it
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However, there are two circuit courts in like positions that have yet to
express their opinions on the matter.251

3.

The Third and Seventh Circuits Have Not Addressed the Issue

Unlike the First and Fourth Circuits, the Third and Seventh
Circuits have not been decisive on the issue of children fleeing
Central American gang violence. After rejecting the BIA’s three-step
test in Valdiviezo-Galdamez,252 the Third Circuit was faced with a
similar social group. In Mejia-Fuentes v. Attorney General of the
United States,253 Jose Osmin Mejia–Fuentes, a Salvadoran native,
claimed that he had been persecuted by members of MS-13 and that
he feared future persecution if he returned to El Salvador.254 The
respondent explained that he was persecuted by the gang because he
refused to join after they attempted to recruit him.255 Mejia-Fuentes
applied for asylum and attempted to establish refugee status as a
member of the particular social group, “young men who morally
oppose gangs and lack family ties.”256 The BIA held that MejiaFuentes failed to demonstrate that his proposed social group had the
necessary social distinction to be recognized as a particular social
group.257 The Third Circuit began its analysis by reaffirming its
holding in Valdiviezo-Galdamez, that social distinction and
particularity were not entitled to Chevron deference.258
The court then approached whether Jose’s social group existed
prior to persecution.259 However, instead of taking the opportunity to
explicitly and definitively rule on the matter post-Valdiviezo-

would permit the particular social group category to be a “catch-all” for Honduran
immigrants).
251. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
252. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir.
2011).
253. 463 F. App’x 76 (3d Cir. 2012).
254. Id. at 77.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 77–78.
257. Id. at 79.
258. Id. at 79–80 (citing Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d
582 (3d Cir. 2011)).
259. Id. at 80. In the Third Circuit’s jurisprudence, an asylum applicant who seeks
to establish refugee status via membership in a particular social group must
demonstrate that the social group existed prior to the persecution. See Lukwago v.
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he ‘particular social group’ must have
existed before the persecution began.”). The purpose of this test is to show that the
social group exists independently of the persecution suffered by the applicant. See id.
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Galdamez II, the court quoted a footnote in Valdiviezo-Galdamez I,
which stated:
Before the [immigration judge], Galdamez identified the particular
social group to which he belongs as “those who have been actively
recruited by gangs but have refused to join because they oppose
these gangs.” In his brief, he identifies the group as “young
Honduran men who have been actively recruited by gangs and who
have been persecuted by these gangs for their refusal to accept
membership.” In discussing the group, we omit the fact of the
group’s later persecution from its definition to make clear that the
group exists independently of its persecution.260

The Third Circuit then remanded the case to the BIA to decide if
“young men who morally oppose gangs and lack family ties,”
constitutes a particular social group under the INA, and in
accordance with In re Acosta.261 By remanding without determining
whether Jose’s group constituted a particular social group, the court
avoided this issue. However, the Third Circuit is not the only court
that has yet to definitively weigh in on the controversy.
The Seventh Circuit also has yet to give its opinion on the issue of
whether children fleeing gang violence are entitled to asylum. There
are only three cases in its jurisprudence that touch upon the issue.262
The court was faced with individuals seeking asylum in the United
States because of a gang’s criminal activity in Cece v. Holder263 and
Benitez Ramos v. Holder,264 but neither case dealt with forced
recruitment. In Benetiz Ramos, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its
rejection of the “social distinction” requirement and vacated the
BIA’s denial of withholding removal to a former gang member who
feared persecution if he returned to El Salvador.265 In Cece, the court

260. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 502 F.3d 285, 290 n.3 (3d Cir.
2007) (citation omitted).
261. Meja-Fuentes, 463 F. App’x at 80–81.
262. See Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013); Bueso-Avila v. Holder, 663
F.3d 934, 935 (7th Cir. 2011); Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2009).
Though Bueso-Avila involves a fifteen-year-old child fleeing gang violence, the case
addresses the sufficiency of evidence, which is outside the scope of this Note. See
Bueso-Avila, 663 F.3d at 938 (“The issue before us, then, is whether the evidentiary
record ‘compels the conclusion’ that the gang targeted Bueso–Avila, at least in part,
because of his religion or church group membership.”).
263. 733 F.3d 662.
264. 589 F.3d 426.
265. Id. at 431–32 (“Ramos was a member of a specific, well-recognized, indeed
notorious gang, the former members of which do not constitute a ‘category . . . far too
unspecific and amorphous to be called a social group.’ It is neither unspecific nor
amorphous.”).
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held that the asylum-seeker, Cece, established that she belonged to a
cognizable social group, namely “young women who are targeted for
prostitution by traffickers in Albania.”266 The traffickers mentioned
in the definition were a local gang who forced women into
prostitution rings.267 Critical to its holding, the Seventh Circuit stated
that because age, gender, nationality, and living situation are
unalterable, those characteristics qualify the proposed group as a
protectable group under asylum law.268 The questions for the near
future are: will the Third Circuit take up the issue with a postValdiviezo-Galdamez analysis, and how will the Seventh Circuit rule
on the matter when given the opportunity?

4.

The Tenth Circuit Finds Only “Particularity”

In Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, the Tenth Circuit became the first
circuit court to hold that a group made up of individuals who resist
gang recruitment satisfies the BIA’s “particularity” requirement.269
Rivera-Barrientos concerned Carmen, a Salvadoran native, who was
approached by MS-13 gang members in her neighborhood in an
attempt to recruit her.270 Carmen refused to join them because she
did not approve of the gang’s activities, to which the gang members
responded by threatening her family.271 The gang continued to harass
Carmen and pressure her to join the gang, but she stayed true to her
convictions.272 One day, on her walk to the bus station, Carmen
encountered five gang members who began to demand, yet again, that
she join their gang.273 Upon refusing, a gang member put a knife to
Carmen’s throat, forced her into a car, and blindfolded her.274 After
driving to a field, the gang members dragged Carmen out of the car
and asked if she had changed her mind.275 When she answered in the
negative, the gang members began kissing her, and when she tried to
escape, one of them struck her in the face with a bottle.276 Three of
the gang members then proceeded to rape her.277 When they finished,
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Cece, 733 F.3d at 677.
Id. at 666.
Id. at 673.
666 F.3d 641, 650 (10th Cir. 2012).

Id. at 644.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the gang member threatened to kill her and her mother if she told the
police, and Carmen complied for fear of retaliation and because she
did not believe the police would help.278 After the incident, Carmen
did not leave her house for several days, but the gang began showing
up at her house to continue their pursuit of recruiting her.279 With her
mother continuously lying to the gang about her whereabouts,
Carmen fled El Salvador for the United States, where immigration
officials apprehended her.280
In removal proceedings, Carmen applied for asylum and argued
that she was a refugee because she belonged to a particular social
group.281 The immigration judge held that Carmen had failed to
establish persecution on account of her group,282 “women in El
Salvador between the ages of 12 and 25 who resisted gang
recruitment.”283 On appeal, the BIA denied her claim for asylum,
finding that young women who refuse to join gangs do not make up a
group that is sufficiently particular or socially distinct.284 Carmen then
took her claim to the Tenth Circuit to determine if her group could in
fact constitute a cognizable social group.
The Tenth Circuit analyzed Carmen’s purported group through the
BIA’s “particularity” and “social distinction” requirements.285
Despite affording the BIA Chevron deference on the issue, the court
nevertheless held that “women in El Salvador between the ages of 12
and 25 who resisted gang recruitment” was in fact a particularly
defined group.286 The court conceded that the definition as a whole
may be broad and with ambiguous terms, but its individual traits were
not vague:287 “a discrete class of young persons sharing the past
experience of having resisted gang recruitment can be a particularly
defined trait.”288 The court then asserted that characteristics such as
age and gender are easily defined and are unlike terms such as being
middle class or being part of a stable family.289 The Tenth Circuit
concluded its “particularity” analysis by explicitly disagreeing with

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 644–45.
Id. at 645.
Id. at 647.
Id. at 648.
Id. at 648–54.
Id. at 650.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the BIA’s determination that Carmen’s social group was not
particularly defined.290
The court, however, denied Carmen’s claim because it determined
that her proposed group lacked the requisite social distinction.291 The
Tenth Circuit found that MS-13 directs harm to any individual to
promote its interest.292 Therefore, the court stated, individuals who
resist recruitment efforts are in no different of a situation than other
members of the community who interfere with the gang’s interests.293
Thus, the court affirmed the BIA’s determination that young women
who resist gang recruitment efforts do not meet the “social
distinction” requirement.294 The Tenth Circuit, consequently, agrees
with its sister courts in holding that these types of social groups are
not “socially distinct,” but clearly believes they satisfy the
“particularity” requirement.295

5.

Summary of Issues for Analysis

In sum, the BIA has added two new requirements, “particularity”
and “social distinction,” to its asylum analysis.296 However, there has
been significant disagreement between circuits as to the appropriate
level of deference these new qualifications should receive.297 While
the majority of circuit courts have given the BIA Chevron deference
in articulating the new conditions, the Ninth Circuit applied an
alternative test, the Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected the social
distinction requirement, and the Third Circuit refused to apply
both.298 In the context of children fleeing Central America because of
gang-forced recruitment, the BIA has consistently held that such
groups do not constitute a “particular social group” for asylum
purposes.299 The vast majority of circuits have agreed with the BIA by
ruling explicitly on the matter and rejecting such asylum claims,300 or

290. Id.
291. Id. at 654.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. Importantly, the Tenth Circuit had the opportunity to take on the issue
with regard to men but elected to avoid the issue by denying an asylum claim on
different grounds. See Cisneros-Diaz v. Holder, 415 F. App’x 940, 943 (10th Cir.
2011).
295. Rivera-Barrientos, 666 F.3d at 650.
296. See supra Part II.A.3.
297. See supra Part II.A.4.
298. See supra Part II.A.4.
299. See supra Part II.B.1.
300. See supra Part II.B.2.
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by simply granting Chevron deference to the BIA.301 However, the
Third and Seventh Circuits have yet to rule on the matter, and the
Tenth Circuit held that young women who resist gang recruitment is
sufficiently defined with particularity.302
III. THE BIA IS ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE AND CHILD VICTIMS
OF G ANG V IOLENCE A RE E NTITLED TO A SYLUM
The main issue with asylum law as it stands today with respect to
membership in a particular social group is that the courts of appeals
have not all agreed on the appropriate deference level or how it
applies to children fleeing Central American gang activity. These
disparate views, or lack thereof, should align so as to avoid
contradictory results based on geography, given that asylum and
immigration law is a national issue. The first step is to apply a
uniform level of deference to the BIA’s three-step test. The circuit
courts should also take the opportunity to give their opinions on the
issue of asylum applicants who are young and resist gang recruitment
in their home country. In doing so, the courts of appeals should
accept the social group definition, “males between the ages of 11-18
who refuse gang membership and resist gang-forced recruitment,” as
one that can be generally applied to the humanitarian crisis in Central
America and passes the BIA three-step test.
A. The BIA Should Be Afforded Chevron Deference
The circuit courts apply varying levels of deference to the BIA’s
three-step test,303 but this should not be the case. The Department of
Justice has explicitly imposed an obligation on the BIA to provide
clear and uniform guidance to the general public.304 Ever since the
BIA created its three-step test and took a stance on the issue of young
male children resisting gangs, subsequent asylum jurisprudence has
been anything but clear and uniform.305 Circuit courts should grant
the BIA Chevron deference to minimize confusion. When courts of

301. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
302. See supra Parts II.B.4–5.
303. See discussion supra Part II.A.4.
304. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (2014).
305. See supra Part II.A. Not only have circuits explicitly stated their confusion
with the BIA’s requirements and how they apply to the issue at hand, but they go so
far as to reject the requirements or impose their own tests. See discussion supra Part
II.A.
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appeals refuse to give Chevron deference to an agency, there is a
danger that it will further promote inconsistency.306
The division amongst courts of appeals as to the appropriate
deference level that should be granted to the BIA in this situation can
be resolved by analyzing the BIA’s precedents and fundamental
agency deference jurisprudence. This analysis first necessitates an
inquiry into whether the BIA deserves deference under United States
v. Mead. 307 Under Mead, an agency qualifies for Chevron deference
when Congress has delegated authority to the agency to make rules
carrying the force of law, and the agency promulgates rules in the
exercise of that authority.308 Congress delegated rulemaking authority
to the Attorney General,309 who subsequently empowered the BIA
with the same authority.310 Additionally, the BIA created its threestep test in the exercise of that authority via case-by-case
adjudication.311 Thus, the BIA may be entitled to Chevron deference
in its interpretations of the INA and in its later addition of
requirements.312
The issue of whether Chevron deference is, in fact, appropriate in
light of the BIA’s precedents highlights the split where some circuit
courts abandon the BIA three-step test and others embrace it.313 The
BIA announced its first prong, the “common and immutable
characteristic” requirement, in In re Acosta.314 The Supreme Court
determined the proper deference level for this first requirement,
holding that the BIA was entitled to Chevron deference.315 The BIA,
however, faced criticism when it created two new qualifications for
establishing a “particular social group.”316
The “social distinction” requirement was challenged by two courts
of appeals for its allegedly inconsistent use and nonsensical

306. See supra Part II.
307. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
308. Id. at 226–27.
309. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
423 (1987).
310. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999). Indeed, no circuit court
disagrees with this position.
311. See discussion supra Part II.A; see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981–82 (2005).
312. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.
313. See supra Part II.A.4.
314. See supra Part II.A.1.
315. See supra Part II.A.2.
316. See supra Part II.A.4.
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application.317 The theory that the BIA has applied the “social
distinction” requirement inconsistently may have some merit. It is
true that the BIA has held that certain groups constitute “particular
social groups” without mentioning whether they were socially
distinct.318
This argument loses strength, however, when one
recognizes that those cases were all decided before the BIA
announced the “social distinction” requirement.319 Consequently, this
argument fails because it relies on a word search of the term “social
distinction” rather than the BIA’s use of the requirement in its
analysis of asylum cases.320
The other argument for the BIA’s inconsistency in applying the
“social distinction” requirement alleges that the requirement adds
another test to the legal analysis without explaining the reason for the
new rule.321 This argument stems from a misunderstanding of how the
BIA scrutinizes asylum claims. The BIA’s “social distinction” prong
was always a part of its analysis, albeit not formally named.322
Assuming that the anti-“social distinction” position is correct, the
BIA may nevertheless be entitled to Chevron deference.323 On
numerous occasions, the BIA has extensively explained its reasoning
behind social distinction.324 Thus, even if it is an inconsistency, it
cannot, by any measure, be an unexplained inconsistency.325 Further,
the BIA is not required to stick with its initial formulation,326 if some
day it decides to stop applying its three-part test. Importantly, the

317. See supra Part II.A.4.
318. See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996); In re TobosoAlfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 1990); In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658,
662 (B.I.A. 1988).
319. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959 (B.I.A. 2006) (explaining it previously
used societal recognition in its analysis, and it was merely announcing it as a social
distinction test).
320. See id.
321. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir.
2011).
322. See, e.g., In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 342–43 (B.I.A. 1996) (applying a
“distinction” and “recognition” analysis to the groups previously asserted).
323. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
981 (2005) (“Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s
interpretation under the Chevron framework. Unexplained inconsistency is, at most,
a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from
agency practice under the Administrative Procedure Act.”).
324. See, e.g., In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 213–21 (B.I.A. 2014); In re M-EV-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237–49 (B.I.A. 2014); In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579,
582–588 (B.I.A. 2008).
325. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, 545 U.S. at 981.
326. See id.

2015]

ASYLUM FOR THE DEFENSELESS

1101

same analysis can be applied to the arguments alleging the
“particularity” requirement was inconsistently used.
Next, opposing circuit courts attempt to argue that the use of the
“social distinction” requirement is unreasonable, and, therefore, not
entitled to Chevron deference.327 The thrust of this argument lies in
the view that to require social distinction would put individuals
fleeing persecution in harm’s way,328 and in the theory that some
characteristics are inherently invisible and, in fact, are purposely
concealed.329 The latter rationale misunderstands what the BIA
attempts to make clear. Social distinction does not require “ocular”
visibility.330 Social distinction merely requires that the members of the
community be able to distinguish the group from the rest of society,
or, simply put, recognize the group’s existence.331 The former
rationale also fails because it, too, misinterprets the “social
distinction” requirement. An individual need not state his or her
characteristic to the public at large. So long as the public can perceive
or recognize a group, society need not identify an individual member
of that group.332 Therefore, the BIA should be entitled to Chevron
deference by all circuit courts333 for its two new qualifications, which
would allow for greater uniformity.
B.

The Third and Seventh Circuits Should Grant Asylum

As discussed in Part II, the Third and Seventh Circuits have either
avoided the issue of children fleeing Central America because of gang
violence or have not had the opportunity to rule on the matter.334
These Circuits should take the next opportunity to definitively rule on
the matter to either promote uniformity among the circuit courts or to
force the Supreme Court of the United States to rule by highlighting a
split. However, in considering whether young individuals who resist
327. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 607 (3d Cir.
2011).
328. Id.
329. See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009). This approach argues,
for example, that homosexual individuals would not be recognized or distinguished
from heterosexual individuals. Id.
330. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 240 (B.I.A. 2014) (emphasizing the
importance of “perception” or “recognition”).
331. Id. (renaming social visibility to social distinction to emphasize that the term
social visibility was never literally interpreted).
332. Id. The BIA explained that members of a community may not be able to
identify individual homosexuals, but society could still perceive homosexuals as a
particular social group because of sociopolitical or cultural conditions. Id.
333. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999).
334. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
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gang recruitment constitutes a “particular social group” under the
INA, these courts should review the issue de novo because the BIA
has already evaluated the issue.335 While giving deference to the BIA
for its three-step test, the circuit courts would be able to review the
issue of Central American children seeking asylum anew.336
Moreover, the Third and Seventh Circuits may disagree with their
sister courts and recognize that young males or females337 who refuse
to join gangs, despite being subjected to forced recruitment,
constitutes a particular social group that passes the BIA’s three-step
test.338
The specific definition that courts should accept when evaluating
asylum claims from children fleeing gang violence in Central America
is “males between the ages of 11-18 who refuse gang membership and
resist gang-forced recruitment.”339 This definition would allow the
courts of appeals that accord Chevron deference to the BIA to find a
cognizable group while working within the three-prong test. Each
characteristic of the proposed group meets the three requirements: a
common, immutable characteristic, “particularity,” and “social
distinction.”340

1.

Gender, Age, and Resistance to Recruitment Are Common,
Immutable Characteristics

Gender is undoubtedly an immutable characteristic that is common
among the members of the proposed group. If the entire group is
composed of men, or male children, they must necessarily share the
trait of maleness. Furthermore, any individual in the proposed group
is unlikely to unilaterally be able to change the fact that he is male.341
Moreover, the BIA and courts of appeals have accepted gender as an

335. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
336. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
337. A similar analysis may apply to either gender. Though, as mentioned supra
note 31, female children raise another issue not covered by this topic because of its
complexity, namely sexual violence.
338. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 232 (B.I.A. 2014).
339. The logic behind the age range is derived from the fact that gangs are known
to prey on younger individuals. See UNHCR, supra note 34, at 4. Recall that this
Note speaks in terms of male children because of the complex legal issues that female
children must navigate when subjected to sexual violence, but it is possible that a
similar analysis may apply to females. See supra note 31.
340. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 237.
341. See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding that the
characteristic of being a young woman cannot be changed).
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immutable characteristic.342 Indeed, even the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees stated that gender is “an innate and
immutable characteristic.”343 Further, the Seventh Circuit has already
accepted gender as an unchangeable characteristic344 and need only
apply it to the proposed definition.
Age is also an immutable characteristic that would be common
among the group’s members. Undeniably, an individual cannot
change his or her age and every member of the group, who must
therefore be within the age range, shares a common trait.345 An
asylum applicant would not be able to make him or herself fit into the
group. To do so would require an individual to make him or herself
younger or older at will. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has conceded
that age qualifies as a common, immutable characteristic.346
Refusing to join a gang and resisting subsequent forced recruitment
can be an immutable and common characteristic if categorized as a
shared past experience amongst the group.347 This is particularly true
because the past experience of declining a membership offer and
resisting the inevitable forced recruitment would not change, given
the fact that it has already occurred.348 Taking active steps in
opposition to a gang would be a common characteristic among the
members of the group.349 The Seventh Circuit has held that a
characteristic may be immutable because it has imparted a label that

342. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (“The shared
characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some
circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former military leadership
or land ownership.”). Circuit courts have also acknowledged such a finding. See, e.g.,
Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797 (9th Cir. 2005); Niang v. Gonzales, 422
F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005).
343. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, GUIDELINES ON
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION: GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION WITHIN THE
CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 1A(2) OF THE 1951 CONVENTION AND/OR ITS 1967 PROTOCOL
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 8 (2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/vll/benchbook/resources/UNHCR_Guidelines_Gender.pdf.
344. See Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 672 (7th Cir. 2013).
345. Id. at 673 (stating that age is not alterable).
346. Id.
347. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. In In re S-E-G-, the BIA found that
“youth who have been targeted for recruitment by, and resisted, criminal gangs may
have a shared past experience, which, by definition, cannot be changed. However,
this does not necessarily mean that the shared past experience suffices to define a
particular social group for asylum purposes.” 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (B.I.A. 2008).
348. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. It is fundamental to their conscience
because these teenagers are making the conscientious effort to refuse joining a
criminal organization. They are keeping to their morals and values by taking the
more difficult road.
349. See Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1082 n.3 (9th Cir. 2014).
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cannot be undone,350 and that is exactly what is done when an
individual refuses to join a gang. The children that resist a gang’s
recruitment efforts are constantly hunted, and they are often unsafe
even in their own homes.351 As the Tenth Circuit explained in RiveraBarrientos, after Carmen had a knife placed against her throat, was
hit with a bottle in the face, and endured a gang rape, the gang
members appeared at her home to continue their harsh recruitment
tactics.352 It seems clear that she was labeled as a person who refused
to join their ranks and was targeted for that purpose.353 The people
who receive this label are all treated the same: with hostility.354 The
only way to undo this label would be to join the gang, which is the
very thing they are refusing to do.355 Therefore, this group definition
satisfies the common, immutable characteristic requirement.

2.

Gender, Age, and Refusal to Join a Gang Define the Group with
Particularity

The “male” trait also satisfies the BIA’s “particularity”
requirement.
The “particularity” requirement mandates the
existence of a definitive benchmark to indicate who falls within the
purported group.356 There must be definable boundaries, and they
cannot be subjective.357 A gender characteristic, such as maleness,
serves as a definitive benchmark because358 it would be easy to
recognize who falls into the group by virtue of their gender identity.359
Information on which gender an individual considers him or herself
can be quickly obtained by reading legitimate government documents
that require a person to identify which gender he or she belongs to.
For example, a New York citizen’s gender can be known by looking

350. See Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 670 (7th Cir. 2013).
351. See, e.g., Solomon-Membreno v. Holder, 578 F. App’x 300, 302 (4th Cir. 2014)
(the house was set on fire); Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 2010)
(gang members threw rocks at the house).
352. See Part II.B.4.
353. See Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 646 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting
the BIA’s determination that the gang members attempted to force her to join the
gang and she was attacked due to her refusal).
354. See UNHCR, supra note 34.
355. See Cece, 733 F.3d at 669. In Cece, the Seventh Circuit held that a woman
should not be required to find a man to protect her. Id. The choice to be single was
found to be the type of fundamental characteristic that courts do not ask asylum
applicants to change. See Id.
356. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 239 (B.I.A. 2014).
357. Id.
358. See In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 393 (B.I.A. 2014).
359. See generally Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 650 (10th Cir. 2012).
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at his or her driver’s license or non-driver identification card, which
requires the owner of the license or card to mark which gender he or
she belongs to when filling out the application.360 Therefore, the
Third and Seventh Circuits should adopt the portion of RiveraBarrientos that acknowledges gender as a characteristic that is
susceptible to easy definition, and thus, particularly defined.361
Likewise, the age range feature of the proposed definition should
also meet the “particularity” hurdle.362 Proving that an individual is
within the requisite age range would simply require a showing of a
birth certificate.363 If the asylum-seeker is below or above the age
range, then he or she will not be a member of the group. Age, like
gender, is susceptible to easy definition and therefore satisfies the
“particularity” requirement.364
The last characteristic of the proposed definition, refusing to join a
gang and resisting forced recruitment, is also particularly defined. A
showing of “particularity” in this instance would require a showing
that, at some point, the asylum-seeker was asked to join the gang, but
he refused. Additionally, an asylum applicant would have to show
that the gang used forced recruitment as a tactic to coerce
compliance, but he stayed true to his conviction.365 Notably, the
proposed definition replaces “resistance to gang recruitment,” with
“refusal to join a gang and resist forced recruitment.” This is because
of the subjectivity of the former phrasing. Resistance to gang
recruitment was not widely accepted because it is very subjective.366
The largest criticism of resistance to gang recruitment received from
courts is the problem in determining when an individual has resisted
enough to become a member of the group.367 Moreover, it leaves
open the question of what exactly constitutes resistance to gang
recruitment.368

360. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, APPLICATION FOR DIVER
OR NON-DRIVER ID CARD, available at http://dmv.ny.gov/forms/mv44.pdf.

LICENSE

361. See Rivera-Barrientos, 666 F.3d at 650.
362. See In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996) (“young women”).
363. Admittedly, a child under the age of eighteen in a foreign country may have
difficulty gaining access to a birth certificate from their home country.
364. See Rivera-Barrientos, 666 F.3d at 650.
365. See supra Part II.B.4.
366. See supra Part II.B.2.
367. See supra Part II.B.2; see also Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 27 (1st
Cir. 2010) (explaining its concern of knowing the requisite degree to which an
individual must resist such recruitment).
368. See supra Part II.B.2.
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“Refusal to join a gang and resisting forced recruitment,” however,
overcomes the criticism that the characteristic “resistance to gang
recruitment” faced. Imposing a refusal characteristic requires an
individual to demonstrate that he was approached for the purpose of
recruitment and that he made known his opposition to gang activity.
This is a very objective standard because there is undoubtedly no
interpretive question about the word “no.”
Resisting forced
recruitment is also an objective term because it narrows the type of
persecution that is suffered. Resistance plainly means “the inherent
ability of an organism to resist harmful influences.”369 Thus, the
asylum-seeker would have to continue refusing to join a gang despite
the use of forced recruitment.370 Like the rest of the group, forced
recruitment is not an amorphous term. As explained above in Part I,
gangs will carry out their threats of physical harm, rape, and death to
both the asylum applicants and their family members. Therefore,
refusal to join a gang and resisting forced recruitment is particularly
defined because an immigration judge could easily identify if an
asylum-applicant answered the gangs in the negative and whether the
asylum-applicant has persisted in his or her refusal despite being
subjected to forced recruitment.

3.

Gender, Age, and Refusal to Join a Gang Socially Distinguish
Members of the Group

Finally, “males between the ages of 11–18 who refuse gang
membership and resist gang-forced recruitment” should be
considered socially distinct within their society.
In 2003, the
Salvadoran, Honduran, and Guatemalan legislatures enacted antigang laws in response to popular demand to deal with the crippling
effect the gangs were having on the community.371 These laws were
used to incarcerate large numbers of youth who had tattoos.372 The
Honduran government passed legislation making gang membership
Furthermore, there are credible reports from the
illegal.373
Congressional Research Service374 of civilian vigilante killings of gang
369. MIRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 708 (2014)
370. See Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641 (10th Cir. 2012) (continuing her
refusal to join the gang despite being threatened with a knife at her throat).
371. CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34112, GANGS IN
CENTRAL AMERICA 9 (2014), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
RL34112.pdf.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. The Congressional Research Service is a legislative branch agency that
provides policy and legal analysis to committees and both members of the House and
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members.375 This demonstrates how society, both the countries’
citizens and their elected officials, distinguish between youth gang
members and youth non-members. The fact that law enforcement
specifically targeted youth gang members shows that Central
American society distinguishes between those who have been
recruited and those who have not.
In addition, though the persecutor’s perception of the purported
social group is not determinative, it is probative into the inquiry of
social distinction.376 Gang members recognize adolescent children as
a group and target them specifically for recruitment.377
As
demonstrated supra in Part II, upon refusal, the same children are
then persecuted for continuing to resist the forced recruitment. It
seems logical that if the recruited children joined the gang, they
would no longer be persecuted for the purpose of recruitment.
Further proof of societal recognition is the recent influx of
unaccompanied minors.378 The very fact that unaccompanied minors
are pouring into the United States is evidence that mothers and
fathers recognize that these children are being subject to
extraordinary levels of gang violence.379 The attempt to send their
children out of the country alone demonstrates that society
distinguishes the children from society as a whole with regard to the
susceptibility to gang-forced recruitment. Moreover, as the BIA has
stated, the Salvadoran, Honduran, and Guatemalan community does
not have to identify which child is a specific gender, age, and has

Senate. Congressional Research Service Careers, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.loc.
gov/crsinfo/ (last visited May 15, 2015).
375. See SEELKE, supra note 371.
376. See In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 218 (B.I.A. 2014) (“The perception of
the applicant’s persecutors may be relevant because it can be indicative of whether
society views the group as distinct. But the persecutors’ perception is not itself
enough to make a group socially distinct.”).
377. See UNHCR, supra note 34, at 4.
378. See Robles, supra note 50. President Barack Obama has named this exodus
of children from Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador an “urgent humanitarian
situation.” Jens Manuel Krogstad & Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, Number of Latino
Children Caught Trying to Enter U.S. Nearly Doubles in Less than a Year, PEW RES.
CENTER (June 10, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/10/numberof-latino-children-caught-trying-to-enter-u-s-nearly-doubles-in-less-than-a-year/.
From 2009 to 2014, there has been over a 700% increase in apprehensions of
unaccompanied minors traveling into the United States from El Salvador. Id. The
numbers for Guatemalan unaccompanied minor children have increased by over
900%. Id. Honduras has seen a far more shocking increase as the numbers have
grown from 968 in 2009 to 13,282 in 2014, a 1272% increase. Id.
379. See Robles, supra note 50 (“The first thing we can think of is to send our
children to the United States.”).
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refused gang recruitment and subsequently resisted forced
recruitment.380 Society need only recognize that such a group exists.381
Society, therefore, does distinguish “males between the ages of 11–18
who refuse gang membership and resist gang-forced recruitment.”
Thus, the Third and Seventh Circuit, in applying Chevron deference
to the BIA’s three-pronged test, should recognize “males between the
ages of 11–18 who refuse gang membership and resist gang-forced
recruitment” as a particular social group for asylum purposes.
CONCLUSION
Despite the BIA’s consistent use of a three-step test, circuit courts
have not unanimously accepted it.382 The Supreme Court’s failure to
weigh in on the issue of gang related asylum applications has left the
circuit court jurisprudence in disarray.383 In their confusion, courts of
appeals have either rejected the entire test, opposed part of the test,
or put forth their own alternative.384 By giving the BIA proper
deference and applying the purported definition for male children,
circuit courts will, in time, create a path to uniformity in asylum law.
In doing so, courts should review the BIA’s decision de novo, and
decide for themselves whether children fleeing Central America
because of widespread and uncontrollable gang violence are entitled
to asylum.
Hopefully, the Third and Seventh Circuits will soon get the chance
to finally add their opinion into this complex national issue. When
the opportunity arises, the Third and Seventh Circuits should
recognize the valid claims that many of these children bring into
immigration court. The horrific conditions in inner cities in Central
America is the type of issue that refugees were meant to be protected
from under the INA. Children who are targeted because of their
gender and age should be protected from gang-forced recruitment
when they leave their home country because death or injury is almost
inevitable. In using the BIA’s three-part test, the Third and Seventh
Circuits will be able to resolve the current issue of children from
Central America seeking asylum en masse.

380. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 240 (B.I.A. 2014) (“Society can
consider persons to comprise a group without being able to identify the group’s
members on sight.”).
381. Id.
382. See discussion supra Part II.A.
383. See discussion supra Part II.B.
384. See discussion supra Part II.A.

